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History and the Social Sciences: Shock Therapy
with Medieval Economic History as the Patient
Daniel R. Curtis, Bas van Bavel and Tim Soens
Since the turn of the Millennium, major changes in economic history practice such as
the dominance of econometrics and the championing of “big data,” as well as changes
in how research is funded, have created new pressures for medieval economic histori-
ans to confront. In this article, it is suggested that one way of strengthening the field
further is to more explicitly link up with hypotheses posed in other social sciences. The
historical record is one “laboratory” in which hypotheses developed by sociologists,
economists, and even natural scientists can be explicitly tested, especially using dual
forms of geographical and chronological comparison. As one example to demonstrate
this, a case is made for the stimulating effect of “disaster studies.” Historians have failed
to interact with ideas from disaster studies, not only because of the general drift away
from the social sciences by the historical discipline, but also because of a twin conception
that medieval disaster study bears no relation to the modern, and that medieval coping
strategies were hindered by providence, superstition, fear, and panic. We use the medieval
disasters context to demonstrate that medieval economic history can contribute to big
narratives of our time, including climate change and inequality. This contribution can
be in (1) investigating the root causes of vulnerability and resilience, and recovery of
societies over the long term (moving disaster studies away from instant impact focus)
and (2) providing the social context needed to interpret the massive amount of “big
data” produced by historical climatologists, bioarchaeologists, economists, and so on.
New Pressures Facing Medieval Economic History
The so-called cultural or linguistic turn that history took in the late 1980s had a strong
impact on the practice of economic and social history. It ultimately pushed social and
economic historians to the sidelines of the discipline, although they reacted in different
ways. Social history was the first to have an extreme inward reflection on the state of
its own field. In the same way that social historians of the Annales School in the 1960s
had taken to task “traditional” history based on military and political events and “great
men” and “elites,” social historians now were challenged by postmodernist lines of
thinking questioning previously accepted definitions and processes of categorization
commonly employed. History suddenly became an infinite constellation of possible
truths. A new type of social history developed, which moved not only away from the
social sciences but also from economic history.
The field of economic history had a somewhat lesser amount of inward soul search-
ing: What became clear was that economic historians were increasingly starting to
retreat away from the other fields of history and find a “safer haven” in the grounds of
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752 Social Science History
econometrics. This, together with the preference for more cultural approaches in the
historical profession, led to a declining presence of economic history within the top
general history journals. In Past and Present, for example, economic history was a
key component of the journal’s reputation for contentious issues and vigorous debate
in the 1970s and 1980s, as seen in clashes over the role of agrarian capitalism (the
Brenner Debate) or the “Crisis of the Seventeenth Century.” Nowadays, however,
economic history takes a much-reduced role within the journal.
This development did not seem to harm economic history, however, because its turn
toward econometrics initially proved successful. Although the cliometric approach to
economic history had taken root in the 1960s (on its early achievements; McCloskey
1978), its popularity soared from 1990s onward, made feasible by the ability to com-
pile large amounts of data and perform quicker calculations through wider access to
computers. So despite the reduced presence of economic history in top history journals
such as Past and Present throughout the past 20 years, economic history journals have
actually established a strong position for themselves. The top five economic history
journals are mostly ranked in the top five positions for the “History of Social Sciences”
category, whatever form of measurement one wishes to take, while in the broader
category of “History,” the Economic History Review is second to only the American
Historical Review in terms of five-year impact factor and “Article Influence Score.”1
In addition, very recent literature has posited that economic history is gaining ground
in respectability and visibility within economics, at least in the United States, shown
by a growing share of historical studies in leading economics journals (Abramitzky
2015). That is not to say there has not been some inward reflection from economic
historians about the state of the field today. The journal Historically Speaking devoted
passionate contributions discussing “The Neglected Field of Economic History?” in
2010, and in 2015 the Journal of Economic History offered a forum for differing
views on “The Future of Economic History,” while the appearance of the book The
Poverty of Clio by Francesco Boldizzoni in 2011, directly challenging the apparent
hold of cliometrics over the profession, provoked extreme reactions in both praise
and (oft-entertaining) rebuttal (McCloskey 2013).
The case of medieval economic history, however, is more complicated. On the one
hand, there are some indicators of stagnation or even decline. The medieval period has
taken a much-smaller proportion of the overall output for the top economic history
journals such as Journal of Economic History and Economic History Review, while
specifically medieval journals such as Speculum and Journal of Medieval History
rarely offer anything on an economically oriented topic nowadays. While participa-
tion from medievalists seems to be strong at the annual Economic History Society
Conference in the United Kingdom, at the largest meeting of economic historians
from across the world, the tri-annual World Economic History Congress, very few
1. Taken from the ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports 2014. The “top five economic history
journals” relate to the Journal of Economic History, Economic History Review, European Review of Eco-
nomic History, Explorations in Economic History, and Cliometrica. Various forms of journal measurement
are used including impact factor, five-year impact factor, Eigenfactor Score, and Article Influence Score.
For the category history, many economic history journals such as Journal of Economic History did not rank
themselves here—further illustrating the gap between economic history and the other historical disciplines.
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History and the Social Sciences 753
sessions can now be found with an explicitly medieval topic—evidenced especially
by the recent congress in Kyoto in 2015. And yet, on the other hand, neither devel-
opments are necessarily compelling evidence for a decline in fortunes in medieval
economic history, but simply a result of the “globalization” of the discipline and a rise
in new research interests into areas such as inequality in Latin America or the roots
of underdevelopment in Africa. Put simply, it is not necessarily that less medieval
economic history is being published but instead more of everything else. In fact, on
some levels, medieval economic history has strengthened its position since the turn
of the Millennium, especially in a body of research that now makes a case for modern
economic development having some roots in the medieval period (van Bavel 2010).
Indeed, while early literature on the “Great Divergence,” a debate essentially on the
causes and timing of the global disparity between select parts of “the West” and
“the rest,” suggested that the economic divide between Northwest Europe and China
may only have taken place relatively late, around the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries (Pomeranz 2000), other scholars have seriously suggested that the roots of
the divergence may already have its institutional origins from the Middle Ages (Kuran
2010; van Zanden 2009; on the “Little Divergence” across Europe; Malanima 2009;
Pamuk 2007).
That is not to say there are not challenges and difficulties that medieval economic
history also faces. Indeed, one of the negative knock-on impacts of economic history
now placing more precedence on (1) econometrics and (2) the compilation of large
quantitative digital data sets is simply that these kinds of methods are not always
as suitable for research into the medieval period. Data is not only much scarcer, but
is often not as readily quantifiable, and this is particularly problematic when one
considers that econometric calculations are reliant on having high-quality series with
very few gaps or missing figures. Elsewhere, the recent Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) report How Was Life? moves away from the
reliance on traditional economic indicators of well-being to offer massive global data
sets on living standards across the globe between 1820 and 2000 (van Zanden et al.
2014), and yet, how many of these same indicators can be reconstructed going back
much further in time—all the way to the Middle Ages? Very few, in all likelihood,
and ultimately this leads to the privileging of the recent centuries over the distant past.
The recent History Manifesto, as a call to arms to historians interested in promoting
the role of history for contemporary society, is very positive about the association
between new forms of digitalized “big data” and our ability to eschew short-term
approaches to the past in favor, once again, of the longue durée—essentially laudable
sentiments (Guldi and Armitage 2014). And yet we have a paradox that these “big
data” approaches are not altogether employable for periods as far back as the Middle
Ages—and when they are, only for limited parts of the world. Big data and the long
term do not go as seamlessly hand in hand as Guldi and Armitage suggest.
Additionally, continuing moves toward the “macro” and, more specifically, the
desire to offer reconstructions of, for example, gross domestic product (GDP) across
large parts of the globe going back in time, not only works generally to the disad-
vantage of the study of the medieval period, but furthermore privileges certain parts
of the world such as England, with the good fortune to have manorial accounts at
https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2016.30
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core . IP address: 85.145.71.89 , on 16 M
ay 2020 at 12:25:48 , subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s .
754 Social Science History
its disposal, to the detriment of all those places in Europe and the rest of the world
(the majority) that do not (Broadberry et al. 2015). And finally, a further difficulty of
more recent nature for medieval economic historians is the fact that funding bodies
are now increasingly asking scholars to be very explicit in the “social relevance” of
their research: direct deliverables, valorization, and knowledge utilization. As one
can imagine, these kinds of things are not always a hallmark of medieval historical
research, even if the medieval period is now starting to be inserted into important
debates on the global disparities in wealth and poverty.
Rather than taking a defensive stance against the increasing need to offer “social
relevance” as “justification” for our research, however, medieval economic historians
should be openly flaunting their qualities that could actually help contribute to fur-
thering scientific debates with relevance for the present—a sentiment shared in the
History Manifesto. In the remainder of this article, it is suggested that one way of
doing this is for medieval economic historians to empirically test hypotheses derived
from other disciplines of the social sciences, and help build convincing long-term
narratives. We substantiate this point by elaborating upon the example of a field that
medieval economic history may be further invigorated by, namely, disaster studies.
This blossoming field has in recent years posed a number of interesting hypotheses
as to why some societies cope more effectively in the face of exogenous shocks and
hazards, some of which are being tested on contemporary societies, and yet these
ideas have barely filtered through to the traditional historical disciplines.
The remainder of the article is then divided up into the following sections: In section
two the field of disaster studies is briefly introduced, with a discussion of why these
ideas have not filtered through to historians. In section three, it is shown why the
Middle Ages are a good “laboratory” for further research into societal and economic
responses from severe environmental shocks and hazards. Particular emphasis is first
put on the potential to perform new kinds of comparative experiments and assess
economic and societal change and continuities not just in the immediate aftermath of
shocks but also over very long chronologies. Second, it is demonstrated that what-
ever new figures might be uncovered over the long term in this era of “big data”
and digitalization, for example from the burgeoning fields of historical climatology
or bioarchaeology, this data will only make sense and have value by assessment
within specific historical contexts—contextual conditions that medieval historians in
particular have a very good understanding of.
Disaster Studies and Its Lack of Translation to History
Academic and popular interest into hazards and shocks, and the disasters that can
ensue, has never been stronger. Books focusing on the collapse of whole societies and
civilizations under environmental strain have achieved international best-seller status
(Diamond 2005), and this is perhaps unsurprising given such dangers have not dissi-
pated with time—if anything, the transition to “modernity” and “cosmopolitanism”
has made our lives inherently more “risky” if Ulrich Beck is to be believed (1992).
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History and the Social Sciences 755
In academia, this broader interest has been translated into a thriving field of “disaster
studies”—emerging from its early roots as a facet of the natural sciences into a disci-
pline more in line with the social sciences. In fact, under the early guidance of one of
the discipline’s true pioneers, Henry Quarantelli, “disaster studies” scholars have now
iterated that environmental hazards cannot be seen as merely “natural occurrences”
(1987; also Dynes 1975; and more recently Cardona 2004; Steinberg 2000), but as
social, cultural, and political processes testing the capacity of societies to organize
themselves, limit initial destabilization, and move onto a stage of recovery (Blaikie
et al. 2004 [1994]; Pelling 2012 [2003]; Tierney 2007). In effect, some societies,
just in the way they are set up, ordered, or arranged, can be more capable of dealing
with shocks and hazards than others. Material aspects such as technology, wealth,
and infrastructure are still often invoked as explanatory factors in the differential
capabilities of societies to deal with shocks and hazards—often combined with the
optimistic notion that market forces would always ensure that technological innova-
tion meets climate change problems or ecological challenges (Shafik 1994). However,
recent failures of even the wealthiest and most technologically advanced countries
in the world have instructed us that technical knowledge and economic resources do
not inevitably lead to more effective short-term responses or long-term recoveries
(Hartman and Squires 2006), but equally important are the institutional and cultural
frameworks channeling their use (Ostrom 1990; Sen 1988).
A shift away from the “natural environment,” the catastrophic “event,” and techno-
cratic ideology, together with a heightened focus on the intrinsic qualities of societies,
should be good news for historians. However, despite a disparate body of historical
literature dealing with disasters in the past, very little of this work has, as of yet, ex-
plicitly linked up with hypotheses put forward in the contemporary “disaster studies”
discipline. While a broad range of social science fields have actively attempted to try
and define and measure different elements of “risk,” “resilience,” and “vulnerability,”
and offered up hypotheses to test relating to the coping capacity of different societies,
such ideas have hardly filtered through to historians (noted in Curtis and van Bavel
2016; Lübken and Mauch 2011: 4; Schenk 2007a). Well-established journals such
as Disasters and the International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters have
a paucity of articles devoted to disasters before the twentieth century, while in a
recent overview from an important “disaster studies” handbook, fields as diverse as
sociology, law, anthropology, environmental sciences, demography, geography, eco-
nomics, development studies, media studies, psychology, and public administration
are mentioned, but history is entirely absent (McEntire 2007).
Such lack of integration may partially be down to some level of resistance on
the disaster studies side, but more than likely, it is the opposite that is to blame. The
discipline of history has up to now not been able to sufficiently contribute and integrate
itself with the main ideas discussed by scholars of contemporary disasters because
of the regrettable move away from the social sciences by the traditional historical
profession (van Bavel 2015). One thing the historian fears more than anything is to be
accused of being “deterministic,” and despite being dismissed back in the 1960s and
1970s with the rise of new forms of social history, “events” and the “narrative” have
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756 Social Science History
made a partial revival. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, historians were using historical
perspectives as actual material for public reform—scholars such as Eric Hobsbawm
argued for the liberating use of history as a set of past precedents for contemporary
change (1972, 1997). Nowadays it seems more than ever that historians are convinced
that the past in itself cannot be used to establish regularities, patterns, and certainly
not laws, and to identify and test these through comparative analysis.
As a result, the shifting position of history away from the social sciences has meant
the “past” has failed to be used as an adequate “laboratory” for testing ideas and
hypotheses with social relevance for the present—surely one of the most important
functions of history (Diamond and Robinson 2012). As argued in the recent History
Manifesto, long-term history should ideally be a tool for understanding modern in-
stitutions, rendering utopian schemes comprehensible, and rendering revolutionary
programs for social change thinkable (Guldi and Armitage 2014: 24). Medieval eco-
nomic historians (and economic historians in general) might be able to forge a bridge
between the social sciences and the humanities. This can be initiated through the
“arena” of a more coherent agenda and approach to the study of historical disasters,
as just one example.
This is not to say that it is easy for historians to connect to current disaster research.
A more specific block, particularly for the Middle Ages, has been the notion estab-
lished in disaster research that the Anthropocene, an age of human-induced climatic,
biological, and geophysical change, is far different to the “disaster context” seen
in the preindustrial period. In the eyes of many disaster scholars, the roots of the
Anthropocene cannot be traced further back than the Industrial Revolution and the
transition from solar energy to fossil fuels, and even then, the global environment only
changing profoundly after great acceleration in the post–World War II period (Oldfield
et al. 2014; Steffen et al. 2007). Furthermore, the work of Ulrich Beck, already men-
tioned, by establishing “risk” as a logical by-product of technological and intellectual
modernity, with the artificial separation of nature and culture only attributable to the
Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, has in the process
made us question the actual relevance of studying premodern disasters at all (Revet
2011). This view has been further entrenched by a past tradition of cultural historical
research into disasters focusing on “popular mentality” and “perception” that has
cultivated an image of the medieval period, in particular, as a time of superstitious
hysteria and hopelessness, with fear, the “unknown,” and faith being considerable
barriers to hazard mitigation, risk management, and long-term recovery.
We argue that there are many reasons to remove these blocks. First of all, re-
cent investigations on the interaction between humans and nature suggest that the
eighteenth-century political, social, and economic “revolutions” are less of a fun-
damental transition than earlier assumed. Current discussions on the start of the
Anthropocene vary between 1610 (when the depopulation of the Americas in the
wake of European Conquest produced the first anthropogenic global dip in atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide) and 1964 (when nuclear bomb testing left a global impact
in 14C levels) (Lewis and Maslin 2015). Some scholars have even suggested the use
of the term Palaeoanthropocene for the entire period between the Neolithic and the
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History and the Social Sciences 757
Industrial Revolution (Foley et al. 2013). Ultimately, the emphasis on indicators of
global change obscures the fact that the Anthropocene is a colossal “black box,”
composed of different processes like urbanization, deforestation, globalization, fossil
fuels, or artificial fertilizers. Each of these components has its own history, unfolding
in very different ways in various parts of the Earth, and affecting different people in
a variety of ways (Biermann et al. 2015). Most of these histories do not start in the
eighteenth century, but way back in the medieval period or even before. In a more
systematic way, Jason Moore (2014) has argued for the rise of “world ecology” linked
to capitalist modes of production, originating in the “long” sixteenth century. Such
capitalist world ecology essentially combined short-termist strategies of resource ex-
traction; a metabolic rift between nutrient production and consumption; and a radical
simplification of nature, as witnessed by monocultures. Already in the second half of
the fifteenth century, interconnected examples of this new ecology could be found from
peat mining industries of Holland to the Madeira sugar plantations, while significant
deforestation and inland sand drifts can be traced even earlier in the Middle Ages
such as in the Veluwe of the Central Netherlands, caused largely by the development
of iron production in the tenth century (van Bavel 2010: 23, 48).
Second, we argue that the focus on religiosity and panic in relation to medieval
disasters is misguided, or at least one-sided. The point here is not to dismiss the
significance of the “religious” response to hazards and shocks in the medieval period:
Indeed, it is clear that many responses centered around the power of prayer and
devotion, charity and piety, the veneration of saints, and the use of relics. And this
was understandable given such calamities were considered to be acts of divine retri-
bution, possibly for moral degeneration. Environmental hazards and epidemics alike
were apparently “designed to edify and teach humility, patience, and faith” (Porter
1993: 1451). The notion that most medieval societies, both in the Latin West and the
Middle East, saw these environmental hazards as punishments from God, tends to
fit more easily with a narrative emphasizing their “inevitably” disruptive impact and
panicked response. In the early stages of the 1315 famine across parts of Northern
Europe, religious figures marched barefoot in the fields in recompense for the failed
harvest (Jordan 1996). Later in the fifteenth century, mass processions in the context
of recurrent disease continued to occur, bearing communal relics through the streets,
with sermons encouraging congregations to “avoid sin”—an official application of
collective penitence (Murphy 2013: 150). In numerous cases after severe environ-
mental shocks or epidemics, religious orders urged for greater sanctions to reinforce
social norms such as the ending of overindulgent celebrations and immodest behavior
(Cohn 2002; Schenk 2007b).
These manifestations of piety, lack of scientific knowledge, fear, and hysteria have
greatly influenced the literature on historical disasters. The greater proportion of
literature over the past years has established a narrative based around an “inevitable”
disaster-fear-disorder nexus. According to the classic works of Jean Delumeau, for
example, hazards and shocks unsettled medieval societies, breaking them from “nor-
mal” patterns and were instrumentalized by the Church to create fear and angst (1978).
Such a view was particularly entrenched within the study of epidemic diseases that
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758 Social Science History
apparently throughout history had “always” led to excessive social responses based
on hatred, fear, and blame of easily targetable groups (from the early Baehrel 1951,
1952; to the more modern Nirenberg 2015 [1996]: 231–50). And likewise, plentiful
evidence has been assembled in the literature to show elements of “societal break-
down” in the Middle Ages, stemming from interaction with severe shocks and hazards.
After the Black Death, violent pogroms were initiated in some places, where Jewish
families were gathered up and burnt to death (Cohn 2007a), while others have pointed
to plague’s capacity to echo and amplify existing social tensions, increasing thefts,
violence (Chiffoleau 1980), and a general rise in “confusion, fraud and lawlessness”
(Shirk 1981: 357), while reducing public safety (Bowsky 1964). Similarly, with har-
vest failures, substantial evidence has been collected for their incendiary impact on
criminality and violence (Hanawalt 1974; Stevens 2015: 34–35).
However, by privileging elements of hysteria and hopelessness, superstition and
faith, this obscures the fact that medieval societies offered quite different responses to
the same shocks. Ultimately, the existence of religion, superstition, or even “fear” did
not preclude coping strategies in other ways (Gerrard and Petley 2013). Even if the
occurrence of an actual shock or hazard was perhaps “out of their hands” and some
sort of divine intervention, medieval populations still attempted to mitigate the initial
effects of an unexpected shock using a variety of institutions and, furthermore, even
used knowledge and institutions to reduce the risk of material or human losses in the
future (Richardson 2005). Alongside God’s intervention in human or natural affairs,
these events also stimulated communal solidarity and neighborliness, or alternatively
afforded opportunity to investigate responsibility of actors involved, including neigh-
bors or authorities (Morgan 2015: 48). Institutional and providential responses were
not mutually exclusive. So for example, even more than the divine punishment in
the form of plague, people had similar fear for the public health restrictions that
inevitably ensued, lessening citizens’ freedoms, curtailing their ritual engagements,
and impinging upon customary community ties and collective practices—and often
expressed in active or passive resistance to the prevailing discourse (Coudert 2008:
733).
Indeed, it is becoming increasingly clear that hazards and shocks did not “in-
evitably” break down the bonds of human compassion nor diminish the capacity for
medieval societies to negotiate and work together. In times of harvest failure, urban
governments might lower taxes on importations of foodstuffs, or negotiate with rural
communities into providing the necessary labor reservoir to oversee and conduct
repairs in times of flood (Curtis and Campopiano 2014). Even the “deep-seated” fear
and angst of the destructive power of the sea was sometimes turned around and used
as a point of cohesion, as flood protection mobilized the mutual aid and assistance of
all members of the community (Soens 2009; van Tielhof 2015). In some contexts, the
Black Death was an opportunity for governments to impose strong and coercive labor
and migration regulations imposed from above, and yet in other places, when faced
with similar severity of shock, more moderate, even compassionate, pieces of legis-
lation were drawn up (Cohn 2007b). Literature on historical pandemics, particularly
in recent years, has begun to take issue with the inevitable association of plague and
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History and the Social Sciences 759
societal decay, with more explicit regard for regional and chronological divergences
(Cohn 2012, 2015; Dean 2015). As Paul Slack once said, “[S]udden disastrous events
such as epidemics illuminate many facets of the societies with which they collide.
They create situations of stress which test the institutions, and the habits of mind and
behaviour, which normally hold society together” (Slack 1985: 4).
We can even go a step further. The preceding focused on institutions specifically
designed to cope with a hazard, either in preparation or anticipation of future danger
or when confronted with a hazard. Most institutions that determined societal coping
capacity, however, were not specifically developed with an eye on hazard response
but for very different purposes. The organization of commodity markets, for example,
allowing efficient and rapid mobilization of goods or capital, in turn alleviating the
effects of a shock or natural hazard, was designed for economic, social, or political
reasons not explicitly connected to hazards. Likewise, social networks and reciprocal
relations may have been instrumental in coping with disasters, but were mostly not
developed with explicitly this in mind.
It is also important to note that the set of relevant institutions was completely
different per region, in the medieval period more so than in the modern era. Among
them were also institutional and technological arrangements that in the modern era
have been marginalized, under the growing influence of both markets and states.
One can think of cooperative and collective arrangements, as found in the communal
administration of land use in mountain, forest, or heathland regions or craft guilds in
cities. Such “subaltern” medieval institutional and technological arrangements present
important empirical cases for any researcher interested in testing the strengths and
weaknesses of new solutions to important societal challenges today. For example,
in the wake of global climate change and sea-level rise, there is growing consensus
among marine scientists that the traditional answer of modernity to the problem of
coastal flood protection, being large, centralized, and capital- and energy-intensive
technological systems, cannot guarantee the “absolute” level of protection demanded
by coastal populations at risk (Tessler et al. 2015). New strategies of coastal man-
agement often turn to the creation of more room for excess flood water, for instance
through coastal realignment, controlled flooding, the creation of “buffer capacity”
(Temmerman and Kirwan 2015). Some of these “new” strategies are surprisingly
close to those developed by medieval coastal societies (Rippon 2000). Some me-
dieval communities in the North Sea coastal area concentrated their settlements on
artificial elevations raised upon the sea level.2 Early embankments compartmented the
landscape, creating several lines of defense. Communal surveillance, maintenance,
and alerting systems provided large segments of coastal societies with a thorough
acquaintance of flood hazards and how to act in times of danger. Such technological
and institutional arrangements were not inherently superior or inferior to modern
ones: They worked smoothly in some contexts and failed elsewhere. Such a wide
array of technologies, institutional arrangements, and social and economic contexts,
and their histories of failure and success, make medieval coastal flood protection
2. Often referred to as a terp, wierde, or warft.
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760 Social Science History
arrangements excellent cases to investigate present-day issues of flood protection and
environmental change. And the emphasis here should be on “test”: Decay and disorder
were not “inevitable” but dependent on interaction between hazard, institutions, and
culture.
So the point being made then is this: Rather than overprivileging responses to
hazards and shocks from the medieval Church, with a focus on fear, angst, and super-
stition, it is clear that different medieval societies had quite different responses and
coping strategies when met with the same type of shock or hazard, even when these
very same societies shared the conception that the causes were divine punishment. A
point of further research is to understand why some medieval societies also failed to
establish or enact these solutions, or rather their solutions took very different forms
and manners (Curtis 2014). On the one side we can look to differential characteristics
of the shocks. For example, it has been recently said that repeat occurrences of severe
shocks over time, rather than one-off unheard of catastrophes, tended to reinforce a
more sophisticated array of coping mechanisms and organization based on applied
knowledge (Mauelshagen 2009: 44). Cultural memory has now been regarded as
a fundamental component of coping and learning from previous hazards (Bankoff
2003; Pfister 2009). And it is true that most premodern societies experienced hazards
and shocks as part of their frequent and recurring “life experience” (Bankoff 2013),
even if this state of “preparedness” was never constant and changed over time (Soens
2011).
And on the other side we can look at the conditions that (1) allow certain institutional
responses to emerge in the first place, and (2) allow certain institutional responses
to be more effective than others. The extent to which a medieval producer could
look to the market to save them during hardship was dependent on the precise terms
by which they could conduct trade: Taxes and extra-economic burdens proved to
be powerful dissuaders, for example (Brenner 1976). Similarly, the extent to which
medieval societies relied on resources from the commons often depended on the
extent to which rights and privileges were bestowed differentially down the social
hierarchy (Curtis 2015; De Keyzer 2013), while the extent to which rural producers
relied on systems of credit, insurance, or support to ease their way through floods,
periods of conflict, or harvest failures was also dependent on the precise nature of
reciprocal networks between groups and individuals at a very microlevel. In the Great
Famine of 1315–17, for example, it recently has been argued that the “generalized
trust” characteristic of trade between strangers in “normal” years was broken, and
accordingly, buyers and sellers switched to alternative reliable “particularized trust,”
limited to small groups of communities based on personal networks of reputation
(Slavin 2014). In some cases, wealthy creditors may have taken advantage of less
prosperous neighbors during periods of sudden hardship, but in other cases, creditor-
debtor relations were more reciprocal and less unidirectional (Briggs 2009: 151–55,
190–93; Schofield 2008). Rather than accepting an overarching narrative based on fear
or inevitable panicked responses or descent into disorder, but instead one receptive to
regionally divergent responses with varying levels of extremity and effectiveness, we
can establish a more analytical brand of medieval economic history. As seen in the
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next section, however, this can only come from more systematic use of spatial and
chronological comparative research.
Medieval Economic History and Disaster Research: Its Contribution
So far it has been argued that one way in which medieval economic history could be
enhanced further is to act as a bridge between the humanities and the social sciences,
which have in recent years drifted further apart. This could be achieved by empirically
testing hypotheses and ideas developed from new social science fields such as disaster
studies. In the following section, two specific ways are discussed where medieval
economic historians can make a real contribution to furthering our knowledge about
how different societies dealt and deal with hazards and shocks in both the immediate
aftermath and the long term.
The Possibilities for Spatial and Chronological Comparison
Comparative analysis, spatially and chronologically, is the main tool we can employ
for description and explanation. Medievalists in particular, trained in case selection,
empirical research, and critical assessment and interpretation of data in context, know
how to use such analytical tools to their maximum potential. Accordingly, medieval
economic historians can also bring some of the benefits of the comparative method to
the study of historical disasters—benefits that are specifically (or mainly) attributable
to the “special” laboratory of the Middle Ages.
Indeed, one element that medieval economic historians can benefit from is their
capacity to offer up all kinds of different comparisons, made easier by the flexibility
with which we move between dependent, independent, and control variables. This is
helped by the fact that several of the most devastating mortality crises, in the process
completely shifting the balance between people and resources in a short space of time,
occurred in the Middle Ages. Perhaps the most conspicuous one was the Black Death,
reducing overall European population levels by at least 30 percent and in some places
more. The Black Death not only naturally offers up its own potential for comparative
research, but also facilitates the creation of other comparative experiments focusing
on other shocks and hazards that would be difficult to perform in other periods.
By drastically changing the demographic situation of most European regions in a
rapid movement, this offers a rupture point through which population pressure can
be invoked as a significant control and independent variable, when testing the coping
capacity of different medieval societies. Thus, first of all, comparative research can
be performed when holding population pressure on resources constant. Comparing
the response of a number of different societies to the Great Famine of 1315–17
makes sense when all societies are experiencing extremely high pressure on resources.
Similarly comparing the response of different societies in the late fourteenth and
early fifteenth centuries also makes sense because it is very likely that population
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pressure can be held constant as a variable—although the Black Death did not exactly
strike every region with the precise same intensity and chronology, in general its
large demographic impact was widespread enough to mean that if one is comparing
flooding or famine between a number of different societies in early-fifteenth-century
Europe, it will likely be between societies all experiencing a relatively low intensity
of resource use.
Alternatively, the devastating shock of the Great Famine of 1315–17 allows the
Middle Ages to be an excellent laboratory for testing the effects of population pressure
on resources as an independent variable in societies’ capacity to cope with hazards
and shocks. Indeed, it has often been suggested that famines such as that of 1315–
17 were so severe as a result of the strong pressure on finite amounts of resources
that many European societies were experiencing at the time (Bailey 1998; Schofield
1997). Land morcellation and incessant fragmentation into tiny plots exacerbated the
consequences of the Great Famine (Campbell 2009). And yet, this kind of hypothesis,
though intuitively logical, has barely been subject to formal testing. Those focusing
on the Great Famine have tended to only approach the subject in isolation (Jordan
1996; Kershaw 1973), likely on account of fascination with its overall extremity.
What the dramatic changes in overall population levels following the Black Death
allow medieval economic historians to do is compare dearth, harvest failure, and
famine responses of the same society, but now with different population densities.
Famine in Europe did not begin or end with 1315–17, but continued intermittently
through the Middle Ages into the early modern period and beyond (for a chronology;
Alfani and Ó Gráda 2017). So how did societies react to harvest failures in times
of resource scarcity, and how did they react to harvest failure in times of resource
plenty? Are there any differences in the mechanisms and institutions involved? Of
course the comparison of both pre– and post–Black Death periods with an explicit
test on the impact of population pressure needs not only be restricted to episodes of
harvest failure but can also apply to other shocks such as floods and seismic activity.
Furthermore, one of the flaws in the current disaster studies literature is that it
almost entirely concentrates on short-term impacts. This is understandable when
most disaster studies scholars tend to focus on contemporary shocks and hazards, or
at least those of the twentieth century—the historical record is simply not there to
carry out time series analysis over long periods. So, for example, in a recent review on
the impact of fluctuations in temperature, precipitation, and storminess, few studies
are mentioned concentrating on the medium- or long-term impact of hazards and
shocks beyond five or 10 years, and indeed, this is explicitly marked out as a major
gap in the existing economic and institutional literature on disasters (Dell et al. 2014:
778–80). One of the real advantages that medieval economic historians then have is
the relative abundance of cases and long-term historical perspective. Historians can
stand back and give an important long-term perspective to changes in our economy
and society that have been forged through sharp rupture points caused by hazards and
shocks (Bankoff 2004). As medieval economic historians know, it takes the view of
centuries, not decades, to observe more clearly fundamental economic change in its
true guise.
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And as medieval economic historians, we can help shift the emphasis of much
contemporary disaster studies literature away from reliance on abstract macrovalues
such as GDP, when considering the “effectiveness” or “quality” of economic response
to severe hazards and shocks. At best, the decline and subsequent recovery of GDP
might indicate the “resilience” of economic systems, but they do not inform us on
disruption of individual livelihoods. Thanks to, for instance, international aid or large-
scale public investment programs, or institutional changes, the economy of a region
or state can boom in the aftermath of a disaster, as was the case in Lisbon after
the 1755 Earthquake (Pereira 2009). However, these economic boosts may also hide
profound social disruption, as local populations were displaced and existing land
rights overruled by state officials, real estate developers, and new settlers profiting
from the “window of opportunity” presented by the disaster. To measure changes in
the fate of individual livelihoods affected by shocks, other indicators are needed. And
partly because there are no real sources for GDP in our era (or rather its measurement
is always subject to a lack of exactitude; even work on medieval England is based
on proxies from manorial accounts; Broadberry et al. 2015), we are able to assert
a number of other valuable indicators for long-term economic recovery of societies
after terrible shocks and hazards—perhaps not the amount and diversity of indicators
suggested in the recent OECD report or the Human Development Indexes established
by Amartya Sen, but significant ones nonetheless.
Indeed, it is clear that terrible environmental shocks and hazards do not just provide
devastating amounts of damage to capital goods, the ruination of agricultural lands,
or the death of human beings, and furthermore, do not merely stimulate or retard
economies and societies on an aggregate level. Environmental shocks and hazards
also have strong powers of redistribution, and medieval economic historians are in
a good position to provide a long-term perspective as to whether short-term shocks
can make societies more equal or unequal, and whether this is a structural change and
made persistent over time.
Inequality plays a role in shaping the context in which societies cope with hazards,
but is affected by resulting disasters. Here, large opportunities exist for medieval
economic history to analyze this dual interaction between hazards and inequality
in the very long run. However, despite renewed interest in distribution issues, our
understanding of the long-term development of economic inequality—going back
into the preindustrial period—is still very limited. This is down, first of all, to the lack
of empirical research attempting to reconstruct distribution of resources (wealth, real
estate, or land) or income prior to the Industrial Revolution. Most literature still tends
to focus on inequalities forged from the eighteenth century onward (Piketty 2014):
The recently developed “inequality possibility frontier” was based on just eight data
observations from between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries (Milanovic et al.
2011). Only very recently has there been a spate of works based on archival evidence
to reconstruct long-term trends in inequality (Alfani 2010a, 2010b; Fourie and Von
Fintel 2010; Hanus 2013; Hoffman et al. 2002; Pereira et al. 2013), yet there is
almost nothing from the medieval period. Furthermore, those much older works able
to reconstruct property or wealth distribution further back in time for the Middle
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Ages have generally only done this for short time periods or single dates—often
reliant on exceptional or “special” sources such as the 1427 Florentine Catasto or the
1279–80 Hundred Rolls (Bekar and Reed 2013; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1978).
However, in very recent years, a few select pioneering works have appeared that
show that reconstruction of different types of inequality for the (late) Middle Ages
can be possible, can be integrated with longer-run series of inequality connecting to
the early modern period, and do not necessarily need to be restricted to places with
better source provision such as England or Italy (Alfani 2015; Alfani and Ammannati
2014), but have been attempted for parts of the Low Countries (Ryckbosch 2016; van
Bavel 2009), Portugal (Johnson 2001), and for the Kingdom of Valencia (Baydal Sala
and Martí 2014), for example.
But second of all, the main overarching theoretical frameworks for why preindus-
trial societies became more unequal have in recent times proven to be less convincing.
The idea based on the Kuznets Curve that preindustrial economic inequality was in-
extricably linked to economic growth, and that this association between growth and
inequality would only end with the incipient stages of modern industrialization at
more advanced stages of economic maturity (van Zanden 1995), has now been chal-
lenged. Indeed, recent literature has also shown that preindustrial inequality in the
distribution of wealth and land also took place in conditions of economic stagnation
and even decline (Alfani 2010a; Pereira et al. 2013), and concentration of wealth and
resources was not always a necessary precondition of industrialization (Saito 2014).
What is being suggested now is that the roots of modern-day inequality may have
very diverse causes, which diverged over time and space (Curtis 2013) and was not
at all a linear development.
This is perhaps revealing of the fact that sudden short-term shocks (such as envi-
ronmental hazards and calamities) could have a substantial redistributive impact for
resources, property, and wealth, and furthermore, sometimes this could have lasting
effects. Thus, for example, a number of medieval economic historians (in the same
way as development economists of contemporary societies) have drawn a connection
between overly burdened peasants, distress or panic land sales, and harvest failures
and famines (Campbell 2009; Davies and Kissock 2004; Jordan 1996: 91; Kershaw
1973: 37–41). Periods of dearth apparently helped to consolidate the position of
large landlords who could manipulate markets to the detriment of poor peasants or
agricultural laborers (Galloway 1988: 277). Less clear, however, is the extent to which
such pressures had persistent and long-lasting effects on the distribution of property
within societies: Were peasants able to regain either their original property or other
sources of income once negotiating the initial hardships, or did this set into motion
the first stages of land consolidation and large farm creation? Medieval floods have
also been invoked as a way of bringing about strong changes in property relations—
stimulating peasant property abandonment through the lack of capital buffers, or
expropriation from the pressures of consolidating wealthy urban or elite investors in
places as diverse as Ming China, Mamluk Egypt, and late medieval Flanders (Borsch
2004; Perdue 1982; Soens 2011), and yet such consequences were never inevitable
as recent literature has shown (Curtis 2016; van Cruyningen 2014: 250).
https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2016.30
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core . IP address: 85.145.71.89 , on 16 M
ay 2020 at 12:25:48 , subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s .
History and the Social Sciences 765
Focus too can be given to the redistributive impact of epidemic shocks such as
plague in the medieval period. More than 40 years ago now, David Herlihy once
made the claim that the Black Death caused a greater equality in the distribution of
resources in the short term—testament to the prevailing partible inheritance practices
and splintering of property between sons (1967). And yet over the medium and long
term this gave way to greater inequality—testament to new conditions created in
the land and housing market characterized by speculation and consolidation (Curtis
2012; Herlihy 1968). In recent times, however, this interpretation has been turned
on its head—showing how the Black Death in many parts of Northern and Central
Italy led to the establishment of great equality in distribution of wealth and property
over a number of centuries—only dissipating much later in the sixteenth century
(Alfani 2015; Alfani and Ammannati 2014). Ultimately, the point is this—neither
famine, flooding, nor the Black Death inevitably produced one particular redistributive
trend—the direction of redistribution was actually quite diverse and dependent on the
specific social and institutional context in which the shock occurred. While plague
led to land consolidation in some parts of Europe or the establishment of new social
hierarchies within some communities, it led to the widespread access to land for
previously disadvantaged social groups in other parts. Medieval economic historians
are in a good position to contribute to debates on the long-term redistributive impact
of hazards and shocks, in particular, because they are able to systematically take
apart and compare a wide range of specific historical social contexts into which the
redistributive effect of shocks and hazards are filtered.
The Possibilities to Contextualize “Big Data”
“Big data” approaches to historical research have taken off in recent years, a trend
that has found overwhelming support in the History Manifesto as a potential platform
for returning to “big questions” and “longue durée” approaches to the past (Guldi and
Armitage 2014). The digital age has enhanced our capacity in economic history to pro-
duce bigger data sets than ever before, with national and international research money
being increasingly made available to develop large-scale data infrastructure to produce
more and more quantifiable figures and numbers for different indicators in historical
societies. However, as noted in a recent retort to the History Manifesto, there has
been far too much uncritical acceptance and trumpeting of the big data phenomenon,
without careful understanding of its costs and benefits, opportunities, and limitations
(Cohen and Mandler 2015: 541). With explicit regard to historical disasters, much of
the new quantifiable data now being uncovered is being produced in multidisciplinary
teams, often not by historians but by economists, paleo-climatologists, biologists, or
bio-archaeologists. Some of this data is extremely valuable, but what is argued in the
following section is that medieval historians still have an important role in adding
further value (and caution) to the figures by first reconsidering the sources being
used to compile such data, and then by assessing these numbers within very specific
historical social contexts.
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One aspect of disaster studies research that medieval economic historians can
profitably contribute to is the historical climate. Alongside the development of in-
equality, climate change was earmarked in the History Manifesto as a main area in
which historians can help build convincing long-term narratives. Indeed, historians
are increasingly being included as part of international multidisciplinary teams of
paleo-climatologists, processing and interpreting early instrumental climate data in
so-called data rescue initiatives (Brunet and Jones 2011). This is importantly taking
place for the period 1000–1750 CE, a period lacking instrumental data, but with a wide
array of “documentary” proxies (direct or indirect observations of weather conditions
in diaries, accounts, chronicles, and ship logbooks). Most interest lies in compilation
of massive data sets such as those produced and published on “Euroclimhist” or
“tambora.org.” Any historian collaborating on such a project will be aware that the
overall quality and accuracy of data in the eleventh and the seventeenth century is
of a completely different order, and a huge amount of source criticism and contextu-
alization is needed (as consistently argued by field pioneers like Christian Pfister or
Pierre Alexandre). Nevertheless, such remarks get lost when documentary data are
subsequently statistically processed into long-term reconstructions of temperature
and precipitation over the past centuries (Glaser and Rieman 2009 for Germany and
Central Europe or Shabalova and Van Engelen 2003 for the Low Countries). Medieval
historians are in a good position with their training in source criticism to bring out
the flaws in this process. By narrowing down the chronological and geographic frame
of analysis, and carefully selecting sources to be processed, more reliable indices
of temperature and precipitation can be produced (Camenisch 2015 for the fifteenth-
century Low Countries, Litzenburger 2015 for Metz in the same period, or Pribyl et al.
2012 for East Anglia in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries), which can subsequently
be correlated to other proxy data produced by dendrochronology or glaciology, for
instance.
The call for historical “proxies” is most urgent in fields where limited other data
are available, for instance when reconstructing storm activity in the past (Buisman
1995–2006; de Kraker 2013; Lamb and Fryendahl 1991). Yet the problem with these
reconstructions is that they are not based on actual data for storm surges per se,
but what was “perceived to have been” a storm by contemporary commentators,
often in chronicles, mostly because of the impact they had on human societies. And
so despite entry in climate data forums such as tambora.org, we still do not know
whether levels of historical storminess over time were actually variations in storms
per se, or instead variations in capacity for societies to deal with storms. The flaws in
this data can be further highlighted by turning to criticism of the medieval sources:
Many of the so-called storms and resultant “flood disasters” referred to by chroniclers,
particularly in the medieval period, turned out to be overexaggerations, suffered from
severe imprecision in timing and geography, or were even complete myths (Knot-
tnerus 2013). In fact, reliance on these kinds of sources has led to an overestimation
of the frequency and intensity of medieval floods in comparison to the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, when browsing through regional gazetteers (Bailey 1991;
Gottschalk 1971–77). Hence, what medieval historians can do for “big data” data
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sets produced in the field of historical climatology is provide assurances and caution
about the types and use of documentary sources—especially in light of increasing
popularity of digital databases such as tambora.org.
An even bigger challenge for historians involved in paleo-climatology is to push
contextualization one step further and to investigate the complex link between cli-
mate, environment, and society. Similar drops in temperature can have completely
different meanings, impact, and consequences between different historical societies.
Although recent books such as Geoffrey Parker’s on the seventeenth-century “crisis”
have perpetuated a view, based on cherry picking of supportive cases, that phenomena
such as the Little Ice Age created disruption on a global scale (2013), regardless of
where and how one lived, it is clear that climatic instability and environmental hazards
that ensued were not the same everywhere. Careful comparison of data on prices and
mortalities would show us that even in regions very close together, harvest failures
such as that of the early 1690s did not produce equivalent effects (Ó Gráda and Chevet
2002). Once again only by narrowing the chronological and geographical framework
to well-controlled regional contexts, can this help us investigate whether global cli-
mate change was indeed forcing political and economic crisis all over the world, or
just producing a “global coincidence” as Paul Warde (2015) provocatively labeled
it. The consolidation of all this new data on the climate, in many cases going back
into the Middle Ages, is a positive development—but the challenge for medieval
historians now is to take some of these state-of-the-art data sets on, for example,
historical grape harvests or tree-ring evidence, and assess what they meant for spe-
cific historical societies. Bruce Campbell may be correct in suggesting that economic
historians should pay more attention to the environment as a “historical protagonist”;
fourteenth-century climatic shifts and environmental and biological shocks pushed
human history on a new course (2010). But were divergences between the development
of societies affected by differential severity, magnitude, or types of shock, or was it
instead the case that environment was indeed a “historical protagonist,” but its effects
and impact differentially refracted and filtered by interaction with already prevailing
differential institutions and cultures (Slavin 2014: 11; see also on this subject Slavin
2016)?
Conclusion
Despite substantial progress in the field of medieval economy history, where the
medieval period is now featuring more prominently in some of the big debates in
economic history, medieval economic historians also have had to deal with two main
changes in the way mainstream economic history is conducted nowadays—a greater
reliance and prevalence of econometrics and the move toward the “big data” phe-
nomenon in the digital age—as well as broader changes to the way social sciences
and humanities research is funded. So as well as progress, medieval economic history
has also had to overcome some new challenges. The main argument of the article is
that to further strengthen the discipline, in light of these new conditions and changes,
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medieval historians should look to empirically test hypotheses and assertions made
in other social sciences in a more systematic way.
One potential forum through which medieval economic history could stimulate
itself is a closer interaction with the new burgeoning discipline of disaster studies.
Although disaster studies ideas have filtered through to a number of social science
disciplines, however, very little has reached historians. First of all, we suggest that this
is due to the shift of history away from social sciences in recent years, but also second,
on emphasizing the distinctiveness of the Anthropocene and how the modern age has
little in common with the medieval. We suggest that this has been exacerbated by over-
privileging the religious responses to terrible shocks and hazards, without recognition
that medieval people did not merely accept imposed religious “disaster discourses,”
religious or spiritual responses to hazards and shocks did not preclude other coping
mechanisms, and furthermore, the nature and effectiveness of these responses and in-
stitutions were quite diverse. Making it a goal to understand this diversity makes for a
more analytical form of medieval economic history. Accordingly, we suggest that the
specific contribution that medieval economic historians could make is twofold. First
of all, by offering up new possibilities for spatial and longitudinal comparisons, either
through the flexible maneuvering of dependent, independent, and control variables or
through offering a much-needed long-term perspective (on important developments
such as the roots of inequality). Second of all, by acting as a place to contextualize
large data sets, often produced by those outside the historical discipline in the era of
big data. Medieval economic historians can use their own training to provide much-
needed source criticism and contextual background to forge new narratives based on
the pool of historical climatological data now being uncovered.
Finally, we end on two clarifications. First of all, it must be made clear that we use
the case of disaster studies as an appropriate example, but similar arguments could
be easily made for other social science disciplines: The Middle Ages remains an
excellent laboratory for empirically testing game-theoretical approaches to decision-
making processes or the effective management of common goods, for example. Even
natural science and laboratory-based disciplines can be employed. One need not look
any further than the pioneering approach taken by Samuel Cohn: using his skills,
knowledge, and training as a medieval historian to review and even challenge new
data and hypotheses offered by biologists and bio-archaeologists on the origins or
causes of epidemic diseases (2002). Second of all, we realize also that the emphasis
on getting medieval economic historians to focus on “big questions,” make more
systematic comparisons, and connect research over longer time periods to more recent
developments may be problematic in the sense that the large-scale international grants
to support this kind of research have very intense levels of competition. But as a
response to this, we suggest that by urging medieval economic historians to start
incorporating more systematically some of the ideas and methods taken from the other
social sciences, and to more explicitly use the “past” as an adequate “laboratory” for
testing hypotheses with social relevance for the present, we will drive up the chances of
medieval economic historians actually securing these grants, when under competition
from other disciplines, and thus further building and strengthening the field.
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